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The Pricing of Community Supported Agriculture Shares:
Evidence from New England
Structured Abstract
Purpose: Community Supported Agriculture (CSA) programs allow consumers to buy a share of
a farm’s production while providing working capital and risk management benefits for farmers.
Several different types of CSA arrangements have emerged in the market with terms varying in
the degree to which consumers share in the farm’s risk. No-arbitrage principles of futures and
options pricing suggest that CSA shares should be priced to reflect the degree of risk transfer.
Methodology: We evaluate the three most common share types using a cross-sectional dataset of
226 CSA farms from New England to determine if there is empirical evidence in support of the
theoretical price relationship between share types.
Findings: The degree of risk transfer from farmers to consumers has a significant effect on the
share price. There are statistically significant returns to scale and higher prices for organics.
Farm characteristics and product offerings predict which type of shares is offered for sale.
Research limitations: The data set does not contain information pertaining to actual deliveries,
expected deliveries, variance of expected deliveries, or covariance information; thus differences
in share prices could be due to differences in these uncontrolled factors.
Value: This paper provides empirical evidence that CSA share prices reflect the degree of risk
transferred from the producer to the consumer. It also highlights challenges in conducting
empirical work pertaining to CSA contracting.
Keywords: agricultural marketing, community supported agriculture, local food, organic
production, risk premium, risk sharing
JEL Codes: Q13, Q14

Introduction
In recent years, consumers have become increasingly concerned with where their food is
produced. This trend has led to farmers engaging in more direct marketing efforts, such as directto-consumer sales at farmers markets and offering Community Supported Agriculture (CSA)
programs. CSA programs let consumers buy “shares” of a farm’s production, and therefore are
an important part of local food systems and farm-to-table movements. These contractual
arrangements also provide benefits to the farm in the form of working capital and risk
management features. Since CSA contracts are sold prior to harvest, the farmer can use the CSA
contract proceeds to finance expenses incurred during the growing season. Because these
contractual arrangements enable the farm to transfer part of its risks to the consumer, CSA
contracts are also an important risk management tool for farmers. Recently, a variety of CSA
share types (contractual arrangements) have emerged in the market. These share types vary in the
degree to which consumers share in the farm’s risks.
The concept of CSA programs originated in Japan and Europe in the 1960s and reached
the United States by the 1980s (Wilkinson 2001). The first CSA shares in the United States were
offered in the New England region, but the concept quickly spread throughout the country.
According to Census of Agriculture data, by 2012 over 12,600 U.S. farms were offering CSA
programs (U.S. Departments of Agriculture 2014a).
While CSA programs have become increasing popular in the United States, the pricing of
CSA shares is not well understood. Prior research has suggested that CSA shares are priced to
cover the farm’s operating costs (Tegtmeier and Duffy 2005; Brown and Miller 2008; Fieldhouse
1996). Yet, studies indicated that farmers offering CSA shares are frequently unable to
satisfactorily cover their costs (Lass et al. 2003; Tegtmeier and Duffy 2005). This suggests other
factors may be driving CSA contract prices. Sproul and Kropp (forthcoming) (hereafter SK)
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derive a theory of CSA share contract pricing based on the degree to which the contract transfers
the risk of the farmer to the consumer. Their theory is constructed using product-level price and
yield expectations and no-arbitrage principles of futures and options pricing. However, CSA
programs generally offer a basket of commodities; thus, we extend a key proposition of their
theoretical model to basket of commodities. We show that the price relationship between the two
most common share types holds even when contracting is on a basket of goods. In addition, we
use their dataset of 226 New England CSA farms to empirically evaluate the price relationships
between the most common share types.
We find that degree of risk transfer has a significant effect on price: shares that provide
pre-specified amounts (weights) of specific products are more expensive than shares in which the
consumers receive a percentage of the farm’s actual production (and share in the farm’s income
risk). These shares cost, on average, $11.93 (38%) more per delivery than prices when
consumers share in the full yield risk. We also find significant evidence of returns to scale in
terms of discounting for longer contracts (more deliveries). Prices per delivery are relatively
constant across shares including fruits, vegetables, herbs and cut flowers, but CSA shares
providing dairy and/or meat products cost $2.31 more per delivery, on average, and per-delivery
prices for organic shares are $3.74 higher, on average. We also find that the share type offered by
a farm is predicted by farm characteristics and by the product(s) produced on the farm. The
coefficient estimates for share types and returns to scale are robust to controlling for selection
into share types, but the price premium for dairy/meat products is not.
Background
Farms offering CSA programs sell “shares” in their farm, typically before planting, with the
promise that “shareholders” will receive a portion of the farm’s harvest. Most farms’ CSA shares
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provide the shareholder with a basket of products (up to and including all product varieties
grown on the farm); however, other farms offering CSA programs specify only one product or
few products to be included in their shares. Although the contractual structure of CSA programs
varies from farm to farm, shareholders, referred to as “members”, share in the risks of farming
and, by paying in advance, provide the farm with working capital during the growing season.
However, the exact contract terms pertaining to risk sharing are generally informal; very few
CSA share agreements stipulate the course of action should there be a full loss of farm
production due to disease, pests, or weather events, such as tornadoes, droughts or floods.
Regardless, CSA programs serve as an important risk management tool for farmers who may
have limited access to Federal crop insurance programs. CSA programs allow producers to
obtain higher prices for their crops, improve the farm’s financial security, and reduce the burden
of marketing the farm’s commodities at harvest (USDA 2014b). In return, members have access
to locally grown, fresh products throughout the season, as well as some protection against price
risk.
Share agreements are written for a “season,” which is normally 8-14 or 20-26 weeks.
Throughout the season, members typically pick up their portion of the harvest at the farm or a
farmers market each week (or bi-weekly); however, some CSA farms deliver the commodities
directly to their members’ homes or places of business.
Although a variety of share types have arisen to meet the needs of farmers and
consumers, the majority of CSA farms offer shares in which the shareholders receive a specific
percentage of the various covered commodities produced by the farm throughout the season.
Under this share type, the exact amount (weight) of each product to be received at each pickup
(or delivery) is not specified in the CSA agreement; instead, the amount depends on actual
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production. Essentially, by purchasing a share, the shareholder purchases a percentage of the
farm’s revenue to be paid out in commodities at harvest. Hence, the member shares in the farm’s
combined production (yield) and price risks. We refer to these arrangements as “yield shares.”
In contrast, other farms offer CSA shares that clearly specify the products and quantities
(or weights) of each product to be delivered at harvest. We refer to these arrangements as
“weight shares.” Because the farm has committed to selling a pre-specified quantity at a fixed
price, these shares arrangements are similar to futures or forwards contracts. Weight shares
remove the price risk for both consumer and producer; however, the farm bears the full burden of
the yield risk. In agricultural production, the negative correlation between prices and yields
enables price risk to act as a natural hedge against yield risk. This means weight shares cause the
farmer to bear yield risk without the benefit of price risk as a natural hedge.
Another type of CSA share arrangement resembles a debit system in which members
purchase shares at the beginning of the season and receive a fixed dollar amount in a declining
balance account to throughout the season. These members generally receive an explicit discount
(usually 10%) off of prevailing market prices when making purchases using their pre-paid debit
account. We refer to these arrangements as “debit shares.” Although these members do not share
directly in the farm’s yield or price risks, by paying in advance, they still provide working capital
to the farm. The final type of CSA shares is “you-pick.” Under these contractual arrangements,
members make selections among similarly-valued options at each pickup. Because choices are
arranged according to market value, you-pick share are similar to debit shares in terms of the
degree of risk transfer and hence we group them together in the analysis that follows.
While there are numerous academic studies regarding CSA programs, the majority of
these studies analyze the determinants of consumer participation, the benefits of participation to
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producers or consumers, or the benefits to rural communities (see Brown 2002 and Brown and
Miller 2008 for a review of this literature). Several studies also investigate the determinants of
CSA share prices. Some studies suggest that farm operators price CSA shares to cover the CSA
programs operating costs (Tegtmeier and Duffy 2005; Brown and Miller 2008; Fieldhouse
1996). Using data from a survey of 62 CSA operations in the mid-west, Tegtmeier and Duffy
(2005) found that CSA share prices were set by the farm owner for 76% of the farms in their
sample. Farm owners indicated that the CSA program operating costs were an important
consideration when setting prices. The owners also indicated they considered their own labor
costs when setting prices, but not to the same extent that they considered general operating
expenses. The same study found that farmers were frequently unsatisfied with their CSA
program’s ability to cover costs. Another study by Lass et al. (2003) found that only 46% of
respondents to a 2001 national survey were satisfied with their CSA program’s ability to cover
operating costs. Using four years of survey data from CSA farms in the Northeast United States,
Lizio and Lass (2005), in a working paper, found that CSA farms cover their costs only if farm
operator’s labor is not included. In addition, they found the CSA farms are primarily price takers,
consistent with Connolly and Klaiber’s (2014) (hereafter CK) finding that CSA farms exhibit
little market power. This suggests CSA share prices are not determined solely by production
costs.
Few prior studies discuss the various differentiating features of share agreements that
have emerged. One noteworthy exception is a study of two CSA farms in the Ithaca, NY area
presented in an extension bulletin by Conner (2003). He found the value of the CSA program to
the consumer, relative to purchasing the produce elsewhere, depended on whether or not the
consumer picked their own produce. SK defined three types of CSA contractual arrangements
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(those discussed above): weight shares, yield shares, and debit/you-pick shares. Their model
predicts that contracts in which consumers do not share in production risk, such as weight shares,
will be priced higher than shares in which the consumer shares in both price and yield risk, such
as yield shares, all else equal. The higher price for weight shares is due to a risk premium. They
also show that a farmer’s decision to offer CSA shares, which type of shares to offer, and the
prices of those shares depend on the farmer’s risk preferences, the yield distributions of her
crops, and the covariances between revenues and yields of her crops. The current paper fills the
gap in the existing literature by testing the predictions of the theoretical model using a broad,
cross-sectional data set of New England CSA programs.
Our work also builds on that of CK. Using data from 453 CSA farms in Michigan, New
York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, CK estimated consumer valuations of CSA attributes, including
product offerings, number of deliveries, number of pick up days per week, and production
techniques such as organic certifications, integrated pest management and naturally grown
certification. They found that consumers were willing to pay a 7% premium for certified organic
produce. They also found consumers were willing to pay an 8% premium for CSA programs
offering fresh-cut flowers in addition to fresh vegetables. However, premiums for CSA programs
also offering fruits or animal products (dairy products, meat or eggs) in addition to vegetables
were not statistically significant.
A key difference between CK and this paper is that CK do not control for potential price
effects of contract type in their model; while they do control for “you pick,” they do not control
for the presence of weight shares. Perhaps this is because the variation in contract types found in
our New England data set was not present in their sample. If varying contract types were present,
then omitting contract type as a covariate may have biased their results. Except for addressing
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contract types, the analyses presented here are similar, as CK also use a hedonic pricing model to
decompose farm-level prices into willingness to pay for attributes of the CSA contracts.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the pricing
model for CSA contracts providing a basket of goods. The third section describes our data set
and the fourth section presents the econometric model. The fifth and sixth sections present the
econometric results and robustness checks, and the final section concludes.
A Pricing Model for CSA Shares	
  
We present a simplified version of the SK model, using “risk-neutral” valuation from asset
pricing theory, but not requiring the full general equilibrium framework of their paper. There are
three basic CSA share types: yield shares, weight shares, and debit shares. Debit shares are
purely a financing arrangement without risk management provisions for price and yield risks, so
we focus here only on the price relationship between yield shares and weight shares. While SK
present a more complex theory based on product-level expectations of prices and yields, we
assume that shares cover a basket of different crops (e.g., a crop index), for simplicity. This is
realistic because most CSA share agreements include an array of different products. All shares
are purchased at time t = 0 (planting time) with proceeds delivered at time t = T (harvest time).
We model share pricing for a single farmer. Share prices across farms are expected to
vary according to the number and type of products included, growing practices, and expectations
about yield risk and product quality, among other factors. To clarify notation, we omit subscripts
denoting the specific farmer whose shares are being referenced.
Yield shares are defined as providing single season ownership of some fraction of the
farm, which produces yields as a random variable, Y, in units of the basket or index. The value of
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the yield share at harvest is therefore equal to the yield times the basket’s spot price at harvest,
pT , or simply the realized revenue per share:
RT = Y ⋅ pT .

The yield share is assignable, so we assume it trades pre-season at spot price, R0 . Assuming
complete markets and no-arbitrage, the spot price reflects the expectation under a unique, riskadjusted (aka risk-neutral) probability distribution, φ :

R0 = Eφ [ RT ] .
Weight shares are defined as delivering a fixed quantity, Yw , at a pre-arranged price, in the
manner of a futures contract. The pre-arranged price is the futures price of the index, denoted

(

)

p̂0 , and it is also priced with respect to the risk-adjusted distribution p̂0 = Eφ [ pT ] .1 The weight

shares are thus priced according to:
W0 = Yw ⋅ p̂0 .

It is not guaranteed that the two contract types offer the same quantities in expectation, so
it may be that Yw ≠ Eφ [Y ] . For example, Lapan and Moschini’s (1994) model of farm production
under risk implies optimal hedging in futures markets depending on the farmer’s risk aversion,
the yield-price covariance, and the basis risk. Even if farmers are identical except with respect to
share type, the model is likely to imply different optimal hedges when futures markets (or weight
shares) are used for hedging than when yield shares are used as a hedging instrument. To account
for this, we let ΔY = Yw − Eφ [Y ] denote the difference between the weight share’s fixed quantity,
Yw , and yield share’s expected yield, Eφ [Y ] .
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In the case of weight shares, the seller is responsible to make up any quantity shortfalls
on the open market, and therefore may bear more risk than under a yield share arrangement.
While the forward/futures contract structure of the weight shares contract removes price risk, it
also removes the natural hedge of prices against yields due to their negative correlation, which is
induced by spatial weather correlations and supply-and-demand factors. Proposition 1 formalizes
the price relationship between yield share and weight share contracts.
Proposition 1. Given complete markets with no arbitrage, the price relationship between
weight shares and yield shares is given by:

W0 − R0 = ΔY ⋅ p̂0 − Covφ [Y , pT ] .
Proof of Proposition 1. The proposition follows from adding and subtracting identical
terms, and then simplifying by (i) factoring out the yield-price covariance and (ii) substituting
the futures price of the index for its risk-adjusted expectation.

W0 − R0 = Yw ⋅ p̂0 − Eφ ⎡⎣Y ⋅ pT ⎤⎦
= Yw ⋅ p̂0 − Eφ ⎡⎣Y ⋅ pT ⎤⎦ + Eφ ⎡⎣Y ⎤⎦ Eφ ⎡⎣ pT ⎤⎦ − Eφ ⎡⎣Y ⎤⎦ Eφ ⎡⎣ pT ⎤⎦
= ΔY ⋅ p̂0 − Cov φ ⎡⎣Y , pT ⎤⎦

!
Proposition 1 makes explicit the risk management differences of the two share types for
farmers. Any price premium of weight shares has two components, a yield premium, ΔY ⋅ p̂0 ,
and a risk premium, −Covφ [Y , pT ] . The yield premium accounts for potential systematic
differences in the expected yields between the two contract types, while the risk premium
compensates the farm for the removal of price as a natural hedge on yield risk. Interestingly, the
left hand side of Proposition 1 is a replicating portfolio for a cash transfer in the amount of
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ΔY ⋅ p̂0 and a short covariance swap (e.g., as introduced in Carr and Madan, 1999) on yields and

prices, in the hypothetical case where yields themselves are a tradable security. We find it a
surprising result that our simple model yields the swap price, since execution of the covariance
swap requires intermediate trading periods between t = 0 and t = T , for hedging in the
underlying securities.
Clearly, in cases where the (risk-adjusted) expected yield from the yield share is equal to
the guaranteed quantity of the weight share contract ( ΔY = 0 ) , then the yield premium is zero
and the price premium of weight shares (relative to yield shares) will be given by the covariance
of yield and harvest price (exactly equal to the price of the covariance swap). That is, when both
shares offer the same yield in expectation (Yw = Eφ [Y ]) , then W0 − R0 = −Covφ [Y , pT ] > 0 . Put
another way, if Covφ [Y , pT ] < 0 (post-harvest spot prices are negatively correlated with yields),
then weight shares will be more expensive unless they are expected to deliver a substantially
smaller quantity than yield shares.
Econometric identification of the components of the price premium for weight shares
requires knowing two of: (i) the price difference, (ii) the yield difference, and (iii) the price-yield
covariance. In our data set, we observe only share prices: yield differences and price-yield
covariance are not observable. However, the anecdotal evidence suggests that the weight shares
are intended to give yields comparable to those of the expected, or typical, yields under the yield
shares. Many of the CSA farms offering yield shares advertise when yields or revenues have
been high. For example, Big Train Farm of Cranston, RI announces on their information page at
farmfreshri.org, “2013 full-share members received nearly $80 worth of produce over their initial
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investment!” None of the CSA farms offering weight shares in our sample give any
advertisement that their quantities differ from what might be expected from a typical yield share.
Further, it can be shown that weight share prices will be comparable across farmers,
subject to inclusion of the same products in the basket. Since weight shares are a zero-risk
instrument for consumers, no arbitrage implies that (i) weight shares will be priced according to
the sum of the expected prices of their components, and (ii) component prices will be equal
across farmers, so long as committed yields, Yw , and quality are held constant. Yield shares will
not be identically priced across farmers, both because farmers will have different risk profiles for
the same crop, and because farmers will have different “basket risk” profiles, arising from
within-farm covariance of yields across crops.
Data
Farm Fresh Rhode Island is a non-profit organization that maintains an extensive online database
of both CSA farms and non-CSA farms in New England. Farm-level data were collected directly
from Farm Fresh Rhode Island’s website (www.farmfreshri.org) and from individual farm
website. In rare cases in which all of the pertinent information was not available on either Farm
Fresh Rhode Island’s website or the farm’s website, information was obtained by calling the
farm. Complete information was obtained for 226 CSA farms within a 150-mile radius of
Providence, RI. We focus on New England for the analysis because the first U.S. CSA programs
started in this area and hence CSA program have a long established history here.
CSA details including price, number of deliveries, and share type were determined by
reading the farm’s CSA share agreement. Many farms offer both “full” shares, designed to
provide enough product for 4-5 people, and “half” shares, which provide enough product for 2-3
people. As shown in table 1, on average, a full share costs $575.82, while a half share costs
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$356.77. The terms of the CSA share agreement and the length of the season tend to vary
substantially from contract to contract. On average, the length of a season is approximately 20
weeks. In order to be able to compare share prices across CSA with different season lengths, we
constructed the price per delivery by dividing the share price by the number of deliveries. The
average price-per-delivery of a full share is $30.34, while the average price-per-delivery of a half
share is $18.89. Because only about half of the farms in our sample offer both full and half
shares (and none offer only half shares), we use only the full share price per delivery in the
regression analysis.
As shown in table 2, the majority of farms in our sample, approximately 80%, offered
yield shares. Only 5.75% of the farms offered debit shares and another 5.75% offered you-pick
shares. Given the similarities of these two types of contracts, we combine debit shares and youpick shares into one group for the remainder of the analysis. The remaining 9.29% of farms
offered weight shares. As shown in table 1, on average, the price per delivery of weight shares is
higher than the price per delivery for the other two contract types. This is consistent with our
theoretical model.
Almost half of the farms in the sample use chemical-free farming practices, as shown in
table 2. An additional 21.24% use organic practices and 13.72% use integrated pest management
techniques. The remaining 16.81% employ traditional farming practices. The majority of farms
in the sample are located in Massachusetts, just over 10% are located in Rhode Island and the
rest are located in Connecticut.
Approximately 80% of CSA share agreements in our sample require members to pick up
their shares at the farm. The pickup location for 7% of the CSA farms is a farmers market and
approximately 13% of CSA programs require pickup at a location other than the farm or a
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farmers’ market, such as a church or place of business. It should be noted that two CSA farms
delivered products directly to their members. We included these two farms in the “other”
category. Farms offering CSA programs typically also sell their products through other channels.
Approximately half of the sample sells their products at a farm stand, over 60% sell their
products at farmers’ markets and approximately 50% sell their products to commercial vendors
including wholesalers and retail outlets.
CSA farms offer a wide variety of products. Most CSA farms in the sample offer more
than one product category to their members, making it is difficult to categorize a particular CSA
program as a “vegetable” or “fruit” CSA program. Therefore, we constructed indicator variables
to represent the CSA program’s product offerings. As shown in table 2, over 93% of CSA farms
in our sample provide vegetables to their members, almost 70% provide fruits, approximately
75% provide herbs and nearly 60% provide flowers. Dry goods, dairy and/or meat products and
eggs are offered less frequently; these percentages are similar to those found in Tegtmeier and
Duffy’s (2005) study of Iowa farms. The correlations between product offerings are summarized
in table 3. Fruit and vegetable offerings are positively correlated. Almost all CSA programs that
offer fruits also offer vegetables (98.8%). However, only 73.2% of CSA programs offering
vegetables also offer fruits. There is also a positive correlation between vegetables and herbs. In
fact, herbs are only offered by CSA farms that also provide vegetables and 80% of CSA farms
that offer vegetables also offer herbs. The provision of dairy and/or meat products is negatively
correlated with fruits, vegetables, herbs and flowers. Only roughly 19% of CSA that provide
dairy and/or meat products also provide vegetables. This result is not surprising since the
production of dairy or meat products is fundamentally different than the production of
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vegetables; these two tasks require different types of capital, production inputs, and labor skills,
which inhibit the farms’ ability to diversify across these product categories.
Only 6.64% of the farms in the sample were located in an urban area. The concept of a
CSA program is grounded in linking consumers to their food source and farmers. As a result,
CSA programs sometimes require members to “volunteer” on the farm. Some volunteers might
help with the planting, others with weeding during the growing season and others with the
harvest. Approximately 15% of the CSA farms in our sample required members to work on the
farm a mandatory number of hours.
Econometric Model
Proposition 1 predicts that the price difference between yield shares and weight shares will be
determined by two potentially competing factors, the yield premium and the risk premium.
Given the anecdotal evidence discussed above, we expect that the yield premium will be near
zero (though this is not testable directly in our data set) and that the risk premium will be positive
(weight shares cost more) due to negative covariance of prices and yields. We conduct a
regression analysis to test the resulting prediction that weight shares will be more costly, on
average, and to estimate the extra cost under the assumption that the yield premium is zero.
Specifically, we model the price of a share as a function of the share type while
controlling for other factors that affect share price, including the products produced by the farm
and offered through the CSA program, the farming practices, the pick-up location, the state
where the CSA farm is located, and other outlets through which the farm sells its products. We
estimate the following equation using ordinary least squares (OLS).

Pi = β0 + X i′βn + ε i
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where Pi is the per delivery share price of a full share offered by farm i. Pi is constructed by
dividing the price of a full share by the number of deliveries (or pickups) per season. In cases
where farms offered a sliding scale, we chose the median value. β 0 is a constant to be estimated.

X i′ is a vector of variables describing the characteristics of the ith farm and ith farm’s CSA
contract, including share type, growing practices, products offered, and state where the farm is
located. β n is a vector of coefficients on the farm characteristics to be estimated, and ε i is a
normally distributed error term with mean 0.

X i′ captures several important characteristics of the ith farm and the farm’s CSA contract.
All indicator variables take the value of 1 when true and 0 otherwise. Share type is represented
by two indicator variables: Weight Share and Debit Share. Given the similarities in the contract
structures between “you-pick” and debit shares, we categorize “you-pick” contracts as Debit
Shares. Yield share is the excluded category in the estimation. Growing practices are represented
by three indicator variables: Chemical-free, IPM (integrated pest management) and Organic
(some or all products are certified organic). The excluded category is traditional production
practices. Pick location is represented by three indicator variables: Farmers Market, Other
Pickup, and Delivery. The excluded category is pickup located at the farm. We include several
indicator variables representing the products offered through the CSA: Fruits, Vegetables, Herbs,
Flowers, Dry Goods, and Dairy/Meat (dairy and/or meat) and Eggs.
We also included an indicator variable for Urban Farm which takes the value of 1 if the
farm is located in an urban area and 0 otherwise. Work-trade indicates if members are required to
work mandatory hours on the farm as part of their CSA membership. CSA Length captures the
number of deliveries/pickups per season. Three indicator variables capture the other outlets
through with the farm distributes its products: Sell Farm Stand, Sell Farmers Market and Sell
15
	
  

Commercial. Sell Commercial captures sales to retail and/or wholesale outlets. We estimate the
model both with and without state-level fixed effects for Massachusetts (MA) and Rhode Island
(RI); Connecticut (CT) is the excluded state dummy.
Our econometric model is a basic hedonic pricing approach. Firm-level data, in this case
the prices charged by the CSA farms, can only be used to estimate hedonic models if price-cost
markups are first eliminated and the competitiveness of the market is established (Feenstra
1995). CK follow Breshnahan and Reiss (1991) to determine that individual farms within their
data set lack market power and hence act as price-takers. Their findings provide support for an
earlier study in a working paper by Lass, Lavoie, and Fetter (2005) who found that CSA farms
exert only 2% of their potential market power. Unlike CK, we do not have data to explicitly test
the competitiveness of the market, so we appeal to their findings in what follows. A comparison
of our summary statistics to those presented in CK suggests that the CSA shares in both samples
have generally similar characteristics, except with respect to the absence of information about
weight shares.
Econometric Results
The results of the regression analysis are presented in table 4. Nearly identical results are
obtained for the two models (with and without state-level fixed effects), but we discuss only the
coefficients from the fixed effects model in the discussion that follows.
We find share prices for weight shares are, on average, $11.93 (38%) higher per delivery
than the price per delivery for a yield share. The coefficient is significant at the 95% level.
According to Proposition 1, our regression coefficient estimates the net effect of the covariance
between prices and yields (the risk premium) plus any systematic difference in expected yields
(the yield premium). The result is consistent with the theory; the degree of risk transfer from
16
	
  

farmers to consumers has a significant effect on the contract price. Consumers that share in more
of the farm’s risks pay less than consumers who only bear only the price risk. As we discussed
above, the data do not permit separate identification of the yield premium and risk premium for
weight shares, but we anticipate that the yield premium is small and may be zero, on average.
A number of the significant regression coefficients are consistent with classical economic
theory regarding opportunity costs. For example, we find that farms using organic production
practices charge significantly more per delivery ($3.74, or 12%, on average) than farms using
standard production practices, consistent with the higher costs of production and certification,
and with higher consumer willingness-to-pay for organic products. This result is similar to the
estimated 7% premium for organic CSA products found by CK. Beyond organics, CSA farms
that sell their products at a farmers market charge, on average, $2.05 more per delivery than
farms that do not, presumably because their products command a price premium outside the CSA
program. Urban farms do not charge a significant price premium, perhaps because additional
land and labor costs from urban settings are offset by lower transportation costs and increased
market access.
We find that price per delivery is negatively related to CSA Length; the longer the CSA
length the lower the price per delivery. On average, every additional delivery lowered the perdelivery price by $0.58, which was significant at the 99% level. This suggests there may be
economies of scale, or at least, an element of fixed costs with declining average cost in the
contract length. However, we do not find any statistically significant discount from required
work on the farm (Work-trade). This is consistent with the findings of CK for CSA farms in
Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania and New York, but contradicts the findings of Conner (2003) for
farms in Ithaca, NY. Future research is needed to determine whether customers of work-trade
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CSA farms derive non-food benefits from working on the farm, or if other causes explain the
lack of effect on share price.
We find that CSA contract prices were roughly constant across product offerings, in the
sense that none of the product dummies were significantly different from zero, except for CSA
farms offering dairy or meat products, who charge on average, $2.31 more per delivery than
farms not offering these products. This indicates that, on average, inclusion or exclusion of fruits,
vegetables, herbs, cut flowers, dry goods, or eggs does not materially affect the per delivery price
of a CSA contract in our sample. It is unlikely that the observed lack of statistical significance is
due to a lack of statistical power, because of the relatively large sample size (N=226). Further,
since both consumer tastes for these goods and the market prices of the goods span a wide range,
the results suggest that CSA contracts may be targeting a specific value of deliverable product.
Such a finding would be consistent with consumers having a fixed and separate budget for this
type of spending, rather than incorporating CSA spending into a global optimization of
consumption, as in the context of mental accounting (e.g., as in Thaler, 1985).
Robustness of Results
While the theoretical model speaks to no-arbitrage prices of the different share types, it does not
speak to farmer behavior in terms of which type(s) of shares to offer. A farmer’s decision about
whether to offer each of the various share types will depend on personal risk preferences and on
perceptions of price, yield and revenue risk relative to the market prices of the various shares. It
may be the case that farmers of certain crop types are more likely to offer particular share types,
given the risks faced, access to farm safety net programs, and consumer tastes.
To control for this selection problem, we estimate a logit model to predict the probability
of offering each contract type as a function of farm characteristics and products offered. We use
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a standard, binomial logit and focus only on the yield share versus weight share choice. More
specifically, the dependent variable in the logit regression takes the value of 1 if the contract is a
yield share and 0 if the contract is a weight share. We find that farms offering dairy or meat
products in their CSA implies a large decrease in the probability of offering yield shares. The
opposite is true for vegetables. This is intuitive because a random mix of vegetables in their
veggie box may be more appealing to consumers than a random amount of pork shoulder or lamb
chops to be delivered. The results of the logit model estimation are presented in the first column
of table 5.
We then use the logit model predictions as a first-stage regression to control for selection
into share type by product attributes and repeat the analysis presented in table 4. The logit

!) , representing the estimated probability
prediction is included as a right hand side variable, Pr(Y
of selecting into a yield share using all other farm and contract attributes. Table 5 also shows the
results of our regression from table 4, but with “yield-share-probability-hat” added as an
additional control. Use of the logit model for prediction and focusing only on yield shares versus
weight shares reduces the number of observations to 123. As a result, there is no longer enough
variation in the data to include all of the farm and contract attributes and hence some of the
covariates are dropped from the model; specifically, Organic, Urban Farm, Work-trade,
and RI are not included in this analysis. Table 5 shows that the selection effect (predicted yield
share probability) is not a statistically significant predictor of contract price. However, after
controlling for selection into contract type, there is no longer a statistically significant price
effect of dairy/meat offerings. Nonetheless, after controlling for selection into contract type, the
estimated price premium on weight contracts is $9.61, which is within one standard error of our
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estimate of $11.93 above. The returns-to-scale estimate of a $0.58 discount per additional
delivery is significant and unchanged after controlling for contract selection.
Conclusion
Since their introduction in New England area in the 1980s, community supported agriculture
programs have become increasingly popular throughout the United States. These programs
enable consumers to buy shares of a farm’s production, and hence are an important part of local
food systems and farm-to-table movements. However, they are also important risk management
tools for farmers. In New England, a variety of share types have arisen with the share types
differing in the degree to which risk is transferred from the producer to the consumer. Following
SK, we evaluate the risk management features of these contractual arrangements in the context
of asset pricing theory for CSA contracts that deliver a basket of goods. The theory predicts that
the price difference between yield shares and weight shares will be determined by two
potentially competing factors: (i) the yield premium, due to share types delivering different
expected quantities, and (ii) the risk premium, due to farmers giving up price as a natural hedge
against yield risk. We test the theory using a unique, cross-sectional dataset. We find that, as
predicted by the model, risk transfer has a significant effect on the contract price: share prices for
pre-specified weights are more expensive than shares that deliver a proportion of the farm’s
production because the consumer does not bear any of the farmer’s yield risk.
Our findings have some limitations because we cannot control for the yield premium with
the present data; however, anecdotal evidence suggests the yield premium is small or nonexistent. This, in turn, suggests the observed price differential is due to the risk premium, though
further research and substantially more data are necessary to individually identify these factors.
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We also find significant evidence of discounting for longer seasons, and price premiums
for organics and for CSA shares including dairy or meat products. Despite tremendous variety in
product offerings, from fruits and vegetables to herbs, cut flowers, dry goods and eggs, we find
that prices per delivery are relatively constant across shares. These findings are consistent with
CK. Shares requiring members to work on the farm (“work trade”) gave no significant discount,
consistent with some but not all of their findings.
In addition, we find that CSA share prices are, with the exception of dairy and meat, not
statistically related to CSA product offerings. Even dairy and meat do not affect share prices
once factors influencing selection into contract types are properly controlled. This may suggest
that consumers have some willingness to pay to support local agriculture, which then determines
the amount they allocate to CSA contracts regardless of the products offered. In other words, the
consumers’ preferences are for local agriculture and not specific products. This is consistent with
the finding of Farnsworth et al. (1996) who concluded that social or “club” benefits drive the
decisions of members to join CSA. Our data set included limited information about social
aspects of each CSA and hence further research is necessary to determine whether it is these
“club” benefits or the multiplicity of product offerings that leads to the lack of statistical
significant price effects for individual products in the regression analysis.
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1

Futures prices models also use an assumption of no arbitrage. Fresh produce markets are not,

however, like grain markets, because there is no reasonable means to enforce no-arbitrage
relationships by buying spot produce for future delivery. For example, one cannot buy spot fresh
strawberries and deliver them on a futures contract written six months from now. To address this,
we assume the existence of complete markets for frozen produce with both spot and futures
available. The frozen market price, π t , is tied by a constant factor to the fresh market price, pt ,
at all times, t, by consumer preferences regarding the substitutability of frozen and fresh
products: π t = θ ⋅ pt , with θ ∈( 0,1) . At time 0, the spot and futures prices of frozen and produce
are related by π̂ 0 = (π 0 + U − C ) erT , where U is a fixed cost of carry (by weight) and C is a
convenience yield, representing the cash value of holding physical inventory in the event of a
shortage (c.f., Hull[2009], pp.115-120). The spot frozen price is the price of a traded asset, so it
is equal to its discounted, expected value under the risk-adjusted distribution, with adjustments
for carry cost and convenience yield: π 0 = Eφ [π T ] e− rT − U + C . Thus, π̂ 0 = Eφ [π T ] , and the price
relationship between fresh and frozen markets yields the implied futures price in the fresh
market: p̂0 = θ −1π̂ 0 = Eφ [ pT ] .
	
  

25
	
  

Table 1. CSA Contract Share Prices and CSA Length

Variable
Full Share Price ($)
Full Share Price/Delivery ($)
Half Share Price ($)
Half Share Price/Delivery ($)
Full Share Price/Delivery: Yield Shares ($)
Full Share Price/Delivery: Weight Shares ($)
Full Share Price/Delivery: Debit Shares ($)
CSA Length (deliveries)

Obs.
226
226
133
133
184
21
26
226

Mean
575.82
30.34
356.77
18.89
29.59
40.07
26.66
19.68

SD
184.55
8.85
102.83
5.56
7.67
13.24
6.90
6.23

Min
85
4.62
65
8.93
4.62
21.50
11.76
4

Max
1820
65
700
41.67
62.50
65.00
36.92
52

Note: Data were farm-level data for farms offering CSA located within a 150-mile radius of
Providence, Rhode Island and listed on Farm Fresh Rhode Island’s website
(www.farmfreshri.org).
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Table 2. CSA Farm and Contract Characteristics
Variable
Share Type
General Share
Weight Share
Debit Share
You-Pick Share

Frequency

Percent

179
21
13
13

79.2
9.29
5.75
5.75

Farming Practices
Traditional
Chemical Free
Organic
IPM

38
109
48
31

16.81
48.23
21.24
13.72

State
CT
MA
RI

59
143
24

26.11
63.27
10.62

Pick-up Location
Farm
Farmers Market
Other

180
16
30

79.65
7.08
13.27

CSA Products
Fruits
Vegetables
Herbs
Flowers
Dry Goods
Dairy/Meat
Eggs

157
211
170
132
88
69
85

69.47
93.36
75.22
58.41
38.94
30.53
37.61

Other Characteristics
Urban Farm
Work Trade Mandatory
Sells Farm Stand
Sells Farmers Market
Sells Commercial

15
33
110
137
112

6.64
14.60
48.67
60.62
49.56

Observations

226

Note: Data were farm-level data for farms offering CSA located within a 150-mile radius of
Providence, Rhode Island and listed on www.farmfreshri.org. A condensed version of this table
appears in Table 1 of Sproul and Kropp (2014).
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Table 3. Correlations between CSA Product Offerings
Fruits
Vegetables
Herbs
Flowers
Dry Goods
Dairy/Meat
Eggs

Fruits
1.0000
0.3636
0.2871
0.2008
0.1747
-0.0612
0.0982

Vegetables

Herbs

Flowers

1.0000
0.4646
0.2438
-0.0058
-0.3250
-0.1966

1.0000
0.2227
0.0379
-0.2204
-0.1256

1.0000
0.1215
-0.0838
0.0436

Dry Goods Dairy/Meat

1.0000
0.1997
0.2230

1.0000
0.4968

Eggs

1.0000

Note: Data were farm-level data for farms offering CSA located within a 150-mile radius of
Providence, Rhode Island and listed on www.farmfreshri.org. This table is reproduced from
Table 2 of Sproul and Kropp (2014).
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Table 4. Regression Results
(1)
11.9388***
(4.0590)

(2)
11.9244***
(4.1567)

Debit Share

-2.3068
(1.5462)

-2.3629
(1.5488)

Chemical-free

0.4440
(1.6040)

0.6388
(1.6062)

Organic

3.4531**
(1.6719)

3.7428**
(1.7203)

IPM

1.7242
(1.8046)

1.9884
(1.8373)

Farmers Market

-1.9506
(2.6747)

-1.9424
(2.6342)

Other Pickup

-1.3226
(1.4192)

-1.4559
(1.4617)

Fruits

-0.7120
(1.1277)

-0.7177
(1.1328)

Vegetables

4.9051
(4.8444)

5.0938
(4.9477)

Herbs

1.9985
(1.4335)

1.8055
(1.5098)

Flowers

0.5170
(1.1073)

0.4919
(1.1183)

Dry Goods

0.6743
(1.1968)

0.6010
(1.2018)

Dairy/Meat

2.3587*
(1.3294)

2.3069*
(1.3575)

Eggs

0.1906
(1.4449)

0.1832
(1.4841)

Urban Farm

-0.5562
(2.1696)

-0.2677
(2.2441)

Work-trade

-0.7541
(1.3458)

-0.8459
(1.3297)

Weight Share
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Table 4. Continued
(1)

(2)

Sell Farm Stand

0.6622
(0.9778)

0.6163
(0.9902)

Sell Farmers Market

2.0473**
(1.0354)

2.0452*
(1.0534)

Sell Commercial

-0.6459
(1.1243)

-0.6027
(1.1445)

CSA Length

-0.5725***
(0.1284)

-0.5772***
(0.1311)

MA

1.0324
(1.1370)

RI

0.2223
(2.6086)

Intercept

31.8580***
(5.3027)

31.1377***
(5.4226)

Obs.

226

226

0.3499
4.4712
-764.2033

0.3524
4.1911
-763.7606

2

R
F
Log-likelihood

Note: Data were farm-level data for farms offering CSA located within a 150-mile radius of
Providence, Rhode Island and listed on Farm Fresh Rhode Island’s website
(www.farmfreshri.org). Asterisk (*), double asterisk (**), and triple asterisk (***) denote 10, 5,
and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. Standard errors are in ( ).
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Table 5. Controlling for Selection of Contract Offerings
First-stage
Logit

Weight Share

Second-stage
OLS
-12.7622
(13.3430)
9.6123**
(4.1024)

Chemical-free

0.4765
(1.1880)

1.1964
(1.9131)

IPM

1.0179
(1.4301)

2.8484
(2.4919)

Farmers Market

0.9227
(4.6862)

8.3533*
(4.7115)

Other Pickup

0.4635
(1.2967)

-0.7211
(1.9348)

Fruits

-0.5965
(1.3243)

0.0116
(1.4555)

Vegetables

4.6514**
(1.8609)

9.4427
(8.4736)

Herbs

0.4826
(1.1049)

3.2412
(2.0294)

Flowers

1.0275
(0.8937)

1.0712
(1.9321)

Dry Goods

1.1170
(0.9731)

0.7458
(1.6255)

Dairy/Meat

-2.6871***
(1.0407)

-1.0752
(3.0714)

Eggs

-0.6560
(0.9784)

1.0373
(2.0435)

Sell Farm Stand

-1.6450
(1.2016)

0.6046
(1.7761)

Sell Farmers Market

-0.5461
(1.1222)

2.2276
(1.4439)

Sell Commercial

0.2997
(0.9389)

-1.8206
(1.5189)
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Table 5. Continued
First-stage
Logit

Second-stage
OLS

CSA Length

0.0008
(0.0836)

-0.5805***
(0.1610)

MA

-0.2766
(0.9809)

0.7317
(1.6665)

Intercept

-0.4417
(2.8094)

37.0218***
(7.3751)

Obs.

123

123

2

R
F
Log-likelihood

-22.4528

0.4422
3.5750
-411.0738

Note: Data were farm-level data for farms offering CSA located within a 150-mile radius of
Providence, Rhode Island and listed on Farm Fresh Rhode Island’s website
(www.farmfreshri.org). Asterisk (*), double asterisk (**), and triple asterisk (***) denote 10, 5,
and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. Standard errors are in ( ).
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